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IV. CONCLU SION ........................................... 1086
AFTER decades of being subject to government regulation, the
energy industry in the United States has started to undergo a
dramatic change. Since the early 1900s, vertically integrated util-
ities that generate, transmit, and distribute electricity have received ex-
clusive franchise areas in exchange for accepting extensive state
regulation over such business issues as the rates that they could charge
customers, the expenses that their shareholders would have to absorb,
and the capital expenditures that they could make. Now, state legisla-
tures and regulatory bodies throughout the nation, spurred on by the
promise of lower energy prices, have started to move away from this
monolithic environment toward a more competitive one. As part of the
deregulation of the energy industry, energy users-industries, businesses,
and residential customers alike-will be given the choice of which com-
pany or companies will meet their energy needs.
As a result of these changes, the sale of electricity will be altered as
well. In the regulated environment, a utility would charge its customers
rates pursuant to a tariff approved by the state regulatory body with gov-
erning authority over the company.' In the emerging deregulated envi-
ronment, the sale of electricity will become increasingly subject to
competitive-based electricity contracts that will require the parties to
manage their risks.2 Moreover, utilities will no longer be solely responsi-
ble for meeting their customers' energy needs. Although utilities will
continue to be regulated monopolies in regard to transmission and distri-
bution ("T&D") services, scores of companies will start competing with
each other to supply electricity to industry, business, and residential con-
sumers. This process of unbundling-that is, separating the responsibility
for generating electricity from that of transmitting and distributing it-
represents one of the primary changes within the deregulating energy
industry.3
1. In most states, this body is usually called the Public Service Commission (e.g., New
York, Maryland, Michigan) or the Public Utility Commission (e.g., California, Texas,
Pennsylvania).
2. See generally Mark E. Haedicke, Competitive-Based Contracts for the New Power
Business, 17 ENERGY L.J. 103 (1996); Paul J. Pantano, Jr., Electric Power: Managing Legal
Risk in a New Commodity Market, 19 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1 (1999).
3. Unbundling generation can take two forms. With corporate unbundling, the entity
responsible for transmitting and distributing electricity would not own any generating facil-
ities. Utilities would be required to divest their portfolio of generating assets. On the
other hand, under a functional unbundling framework, the utility could own generating
facilities, but must establish sufficient internal and accounting controls to treat the generat-
ing component as if it were separate from the company's T&D functions. See generally 61
Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,551 (1996) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order 888).
Both forms of unbundling are being used in deregulating the energy industry. For the
purposes of this Comment, however, the generic term "unbundling" will be used to refer to
both corporate and functional unbundling.
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Parties seeking to control their risks related to the sale of electricity in
the changing industry may want their contracts governed by Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code ("Code") and the stability it offers. 4 But
before participants in the deregulated industry can rely on the Code as
they execute and perform on competitive-based contracts, a key prelimi-
nary issue must be addressed: whether the Code applies to the sale of
electricity. As will be discussed below, courts have split on this question
in the context of electricity supplied by vertically integrated utilities. As
the relationships among energy suppliers, energy users, and other market
participants change and develop within the evolving energy industry, this
question is likely to continue to arise. Thus, as these parties seek to de-
fine their contractual relationships, the question of the Code's applicabil-
ity to electricity will become increasingly important.
This Comment examines this fundamental question. Part I surveys the
rationales courts have used when they addressed the issue in the regu-
lated, utility-dominated environment. In Part II, these rationales are crit-
ically evaluated to determine the appropriate method for analyzing
whether the Code should govern the sale of electricity. After considering
public policy arguments on both sides, the Comment determines that the
Code should govern the unbundled sale of electricity. Finally, this Com-
ment considers some of the legal issues that may arise under the Code in
the deregulated industry.
I. EXTANT AUTHORITY
A. RELEVANT CODE PROVISIONS
The key legal question to determine when considering whether the
Code applies to the sale of electricity is whether electricity is a good or
service. Because the Code governs transactions in goods, 5 electricity
must be considered a good for the Code to apply. On the other hand, if
the sale of electricity were classified as a service, it would be controlled
by a state's legal rules regarding service contracts. Therefore, the Code's
definition of a "good," as well as other related terms, will drive the analy-
sis of applying the Code to the sale of electricity.
The Code defines the term "goods" to mean "all things (including spe-
cially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identifica-
tion to the contract for sale."'6 It also requires that "[g]oods must be both
existing and identified before any interest in them can pass."' 7 The parties
can explicitly agree to the manner in which goods are identified to a con-
4. Note, however, that applying the Code in a regulated environment may have in-
creased the legal exposure of energy suppliers. See Jane P. Mallor, Utility "Services" Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: Are Public Utilities in for a Shock?, 56 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 89, 119 (1980).
5. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2000).
6. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2000).
7. U.C.C. § 2-105(2) (2000).
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tract.8 Otherwise, identification takes place either at the time of contract
for previously existing and identified goods9 or, in the case of future
goods, "when goods are shipped, marked or otherwise designated by the
seller as goods to which the contract refers." 10 A "sale" occurs under the
Code upon "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.""
Title passes upon the seller's physical delivery of the goods to a destina-
tion or upon shipment, depending on the terms of the contract. 12
B. ELECTRICITY CASES ADDRESSING THE CODE
A number of courts have directly addressed whether the Code governs
the sale of electricity. But no clear position has emerged. The courts are
split on whether electricity constitutes a service or a "good" under the
Code. In the following overview of these cases, emphasis placed on the
rationales that the courts have used to reach their conclusion. Some at-
tention is also is paid to the facts of certain cases. The events that have
resulted in these cases-power surges, contact with power lines, breach of
contract, just to name a few-will continue to take place in the deregu-
lated energy industry as well, so it is useful to understand the contexts in
which the issue of whether electricity constitutes a good or service arises.
1. Cases Finding That Electricity Is a Good Under the Code
In Helvey v. Wabash County REMC,'3 Helvey sought to recover dam-
ages caused to his 110-volt household appliances when the power com-
pany supplied electricity of 135 or more volts.' 4 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the REMC on the grounds that the Code's four-
year statute of limitations for damage to personal property barred Helvey
from bringing his claim. 15 Helvey appealed, averring that the sale of elec-
tricity constituted a service; therefore, the Code did not apply.' 6 As a
result, he was entitled to a six-year statute of limitations. 17
The Indiana Court of Appeals first noted that electricity can be owned,
bartered, sold, stolen, and taxed.' 8 Moreover, for electricity to constitute
a "good" under the Code, it must be "(1) a thing; (2) existing; and (3)
movable, with (2) and (3) existing simultaneously."' 9 The court held that
electricity satisfies these elements.20 It debunked Helvey's contention
8. See U.C.C. § 2-501(1) (2000).
9. See U.C.C. § 2-501(l)(a) (2000).
10. U.C.C. § 2-501(1)(b) (2000).
11. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2000).
12. See U.C.C. § 2-401(2)(a), (b) (2000).
13. 278 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
14. Id. at 609.
15. See id. (citing IND. CODE § 26-1-2-725 (1971)); see also U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (2000)
("An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after
the cause of action has accrued.").
16. See Helvey, 278 N.E.2d at 610.
17. See id.
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that electricity is not movable by referencing the monthly power bill all
customers receive from the power company.2' Specifically, it concluded
that "[l]ogic would indicate that whatever can be measured in order to
establish the price to be paid would be indicative of fulfilling both the
existing and movable requirements of goods."'22 Thus, since the sale of
electricity constituted a transaction of goods, the Code's statute of limita-
tions provision governed.
Bellotti v. Duquesne Light Co. 23 presented a mirror image of Helvey.
In Bellotti, the plaintiff contended that electricity constituted a good to
take advantage of the Code's four-year statute of limitations, which was
two years longer than the statute of limitations governing Pennsylvania
tort law.24 Bellotti claimed that a power surge that entered his residence
breached the Pennsylvania Code's implied warranties of
merchantability 25 and of fitness for a particular purpose.2 6
The court found Duquesne Light's contention that it provided a service
to be inconsistent with Pennsylvania case law.27 The court drew upon the
Pennsylvania Superior Court's decision in Schriner v. Pennsylvania Power
& Light Co.,28 which addressed whether electricity constituted a "prod-
uct" in a product liability tort case.29 In Schriner, the court distinguished
electricity that remained in the utility's T&D system from electricity that
had passed through the customer's meter.30 Only electricity that passed
through the customer's meter could be considered a "product."'31 Rea-
soning by analogy, the Bellotti court "assume[d] that the rationale which
supported the Schriner ... holding would also govern the issue of when
electricity is a 'good' within the meaning" of the Code.32
21. See id.
22. Helvey, 278 N.E.2d at 610.
23. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1393 (Allegheny County 1987) (Court of Common Pleas of
Pennsylvania).
24. Id. at 1394 (footnote 1 summarizes Pennsylvania's statute of limitations period for
negligence actions).
25. See id. (citing 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2314); see also U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2000) ("a
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind").
26. See Bellotti, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1394 (citing 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2315); see
also U.C.C. § 2-315 (2000) ("Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on
the seller's skill or judgment to ... furnish suitable goods, there is ... an implied warranty
that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.").
27. See Bellotti, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1394.
28. 501 A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
29. See Bellotti, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1394 (discussing Schriner).
30. See Schriner, 501 A.2d at 1134 (by passing through the customer's meter, the elec-
tricity has entered the "stream of commerce").
31. See id.
32. Bellotti, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1395. The Bellotti court also referenced Wivagg
v. Duquesne Light Co., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 597, 598-602 (C.P. Pa. Allegheny County
1975), which acknowledged that the sale of electricity is a sales-service hybrid transaction




The distinction between "electricity in its raw state ... [and] metered
amounts passing through utility-owned conduits and into the homes of
consumers" has developed into an important criterion for determining
whether the Code applies to the sale of electricity. 33 Courts have used
this distinction to find that the post-metered form of electricity is a
"good" under the Code 34 and that the pre-metered form is not governed
by the Code. 35 But the pre- and post-metering distinction, while impor-
tant and useful, is not dispositive in determining whether electricity is a
good or a service.
2. Cases Finding That Electricity Is Not a Good Under the Code
As noted above, some courts have declined to consider pre-metered
electricity a "good" as defined in the Code. In such cases, the electricity
remained in the utility's T&D system at the time of the incident that gave
rise to the alleged cause of action. For example, in Singer Co. v. Balti-
more Gas & Elec. Co.,3 6 the plaintiff sued for damages associated with a
series of power interruptions.37 The outages were traced to "multiple
failures on the underground [distribution] cable. '38 According to the
court, "raw high voltage electricity contained in a utility company's distri-
bution system.., has not yet been converted into a useable state of lower
voltage ... [and] is not the refined product that the customer intends to
buy."'39 For these reasons, the court held that pre-metered electricity was
not a "good" as defined in the Code.40
A Texas court of appeals followed similar reasoning to hold that "the
transmission of electrical energy along high tension power lines which
eventually leads into a transformer is not goods."'41 In Navarro County
Elec. Coop. v. Prince, the plaintiff made contact with the electric coopera-
tive's overhead transmission line as he was adjusting a television an-
tenna.42 As a basis for his action, Prince claimed that the transmission
lines were not adequate packaging for the electricity and thus violated the
implied warranty of merchantability in section 2.314 of the Texas Busi-
33. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Goebel, 502 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ohio Mun. 1986); see
also Mallor, supra note 4, at 95 ("In utility supply contracts identification occurs, at the
very latest, when the utility product is drawn through the customer's meter.").
34. See Cincinnati Gas, 502 N.E.2d at 715.
35. See Hedges v. Public Serv. Co., 396 N.E.2d 933, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) ("In
Helvey we had no problem finding a sale of goods because the electrical current has passed
through the meter .. .[but] the tragic escape of 7200 volts from the transmission wire
[before the electricity passed through the meter], through the ladder, and into the bodies of
these men is not a transaction in goods ....").
36. 558 A.2d 419, 421 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
37. Id. at 421.
38. Id. at 423 (quoting from a letter from Baltimore Gas & Electric to Singer).
39. Id. at 424 (citing Hedges and Cincinnati Gas).
40. See id (affirming the trial court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's Code warranty
claims).
41. Navarro County Elec. Coop. v. Prince, 640 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1982, no writ).
42. Id. at 399.
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ness and Commerce Code.43 The court considered section 2.314's ele-
ments of merchantability, including whether electricity was a fungible
good and whether it was adequately packaged or labeled.4 4 It concluded
that electrical energy was not a fungible good nor could it be packaged or
labeled adequately. Since electricity failed to meet these statutory ele-
ments, the court held that "the sale of electric energy would more fit-
tingly be termed the rendition of a service. '45 In Houston Lighting &
Power Co. v. Reynolds,46 however, the Supreme Court of Texas faced the
question of first impression of whether electricity was a product for the
purposes of tortious product liability.47 The court noted a conflict be-
tween Navarro County and another court of appeals decision, Erwin v.
Guadalupe Valley Elec. Coop.,48 which assumed without discussion that
the sale of electricity involved a product. The Houston Lighting court, in
holding that electricity is a product, stated that "[e]lectricity is a commod-
ity, which, like other goods, can be manufactured, transported and
sold."'49 As a result, the Texas Supreme Court rejected that part of the
Navarro County holding that considered electricity to be a service. 50
Thus, although Navarro County's value as precedent in Texas mostly has
been negated, the court's analysis regarding the sale of electricity, in light
of the language of the Code's implied warranties provision, offers one
approach for considering whether the Code should apply.
Other courts have not provided such a detailed analysis reflecting the
basis for their decision that electricity is not a "good" as defined by the
Code. For example, in Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co.,
a Michigan court of appeals agreed with the trial court's holding that "be-
cause of the properties or character of electricity, it is not a good" under
the Code.51 The court, however, did not elaborate as to which properties
43. See id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-314 (2000).
44. See Navarro County, 640 S.W.2d at 400; see also U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(b) (2000)("Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as ... in the case of fungible goods, are
of fair average quality within the description."); U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(e) (2000) ("Goods to be
merchantable must be at least such as ... are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled
as the agreement may require.").
45. Navarro County, 640 S.W.2d at 400.
46. 765 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1988).
47. Id. at 785.
48. 505 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
49. Houston Lighting, 765 S.W.2d at 785 (citing Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 212
Cal. Rptr. 283, 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)).
50. The Houston Lighting court, however, did not hold that the Code applies to the
sale of electricity; nor has any subsequent Texas case. But cf. Grace v. Zimmerman, 853
S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (in a case after Houston
Lighting, the court applied Navarro County's conclusion that electricity is not goods under
the Code in a case involving sewer rights).
51. Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 196 N.W.2d 316, 317 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1972). Nevertheless, the court determined that if the electricity that passed
through a customer's meter was defective, it was inherently dangerous in nature. There-
fore, the concepts of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability, borrowed from the
Code, should apply to the sale of electricity. Id. at 318 (including footnote 4). The Buck-
eye Union court's application of Code provisions to a service provides an example of using
the Code by analogy. See Mallor, supra note 4, at 96 ("[This] approach ... applies or
refuses to apply the Code by analogy. Although courts using this approach generally rec-
1057
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the trial court was referring. Buckeye Union represents one of the earli-
est cases addressing whether electricity is a good or service. Other courts
have cited it as holding that the sale of electricity is a service.52 But the
court's lack of discussion regarding the properties that make electricity
not a good hardly resolves the matter, particularly when the Houston
Lighting court considered that electricity's properties made it a product.5 3
The facts of the case as the plaintiff pleaded them 54 made it very similar
to Helvey.55 Buckeye Union, however, ended in a different result from
Helvey regarding whether electricity is a good or service, presumably be-
cause of Buckeye Union's reliance on electricity's unstated properties.
Although Buckeye Union did not fully address the issue of electricity's
properties, the development of New York case law provides insight into
which properties and characteristics would lead a court to conclude that
electricity is not a good. Farina v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.5 6 was
the first New York case that addressed the characteristics of electricity.5 7
The court noted several characteristics of electricity that led it to con-
clude that the doctrine of strict product liability did not apply to the case
at bar. These characteristics included the fact that electricity that remains
in the utility's T&D system "is not in a marketable state."58 In addition,
the court referred to electricity as "[a] subtle agency that pervades all
space and evades successful definition." 59 Based primarily on its review
of other cases and commentaries, the court found that electricity was not
a product for the purposes of strict product liability. 60 In regard to the
plaintiff's Code-based claims, the Farina court first rejected a claim based
on Code section 2-318 regarding third party beneficiaries of a seller's war-
ranty.6' The court found that no sale occurred. Therefore, the utility was
not a seller, and Code Section 2-318 did not apply.62 Finally, in dis-
missing the plaintiff's remaining causes of action, the court stated with no
other discussion "we are unable to conclude that it was intended that
ognize some element of service in utility supply contracts, they consider the sales-service
distinction to be irrelevant.").
52. See, e.g., Cincinnati Gas, 502 N.E.2d at 714; Navarro County, 640 S.W.2d at 400.
53. See Houston Lighting, 765 S.W.2d at 785.
54. See Buckeye Union, 196 N.W.2d at 317-19. In Buckeye Union, a fire caused by an
electrical arc that passed along the defendant's distribution line into the house allegedly
destroyed the plaintiffs' house. The court determined that the plaintiff did not sufficiently
support his allegations.
55. See Helvey, 278 N.E.2d at 609.
56. 438 N.Y.S.2d 645 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
57. See id. at 646-47. The plaintiff's husband was killed after he touched an antenna to
an overhead power line owned by Niagara Mohawk. The trial court rejected the utility's
motion to dismiss Farina's claims of breach of warranty under the Code and strict product
liability.
58. Id. (citing Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 343 N..E.2d 465 (II. 1976)).
59. Farina, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 647 (quoting BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY).
60. See Farina, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 647 (citations omitted).
61. See id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-318 (2000) (Alternative C: "A seller's warranty ...
extends to any person who may reasonably ... be affected by the goods and who is injured
by the breach of the warranty.").
62. See Farina, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
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electricity be included within the definition of 'goods."' 63
This last statement provided sufficient authority for two courts follow-
ing New York law to dismiss other Code-based claims, even without as-
sessing any factual differences between Farina and their cases.64 Finally,
in Bowen v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,65 a products liability case, the
court recognized the factual distinction between Farina and the case at
bar where "the electricity had passed through the customer's electric
meter. '66 It also considered the properties and characteristics of electric-
ity that led it to conclude that electricity, even in its post-metered form,
was a service and not a good or product. Borrowing heavily from an
Ohio case,67 the Bowen court stated:
Electricity is the flow of electrically charged particles along a conduc-
tor. The utility does not "manufacture" electrically charged parti-
cles, "but rather, sets in motion the necessary elements that allow the
flow of electricity." The consumer pays for electricity by kilowatt
hour, that is, the length of time electricity flows through the system.
There is no individual product. Instead, the consumer pays for the
use of electricity.68
These characteristics of electricity may have been similar to the unstated
properties relied on by the Buckeye Union court.
Ecogen Four Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.69 offered
a different fact scenario, but one where the court concluded that electric-
ity did not constitute a good without much discussion. Instead of a law-
suit between a utility and a retail customer, Ecogen involved the
wholesale sale of electricity from independent power producers ("IPPs")
to the utility.70 Although the case involved several issues, the key Code-
related matter stemmed from Niagara Mohawk, a regulated utility that
63. Id.
64. See United States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 590 F. Supp. 266, 269 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) ("[I]n New York, electricity is not considered 'goods' and the U.C.C. therefore is not
directly applicable to contracts involving the provision of electricity."); Zoller v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 525 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) ("Under [Farina's]
authority, the ... breach of warranty cause of action was also properly dismissed."). In
these cases, unlike in Farina, the events that gave rise to the alleged causes of action oc-
curred after the electricity had passed through the customer's meter, but neither court
considered that distinction.
65. 590 N.Y.S.2d 628 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
66. Id. at 631.
67. See Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835 (Ohio 1988).
68. Bowen, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32 (quoting Otte, 523 N.E.2d at 838; full citation
omitted).
69. 914 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
70. Id. at 58-60. The plaintiffs, Ecogen Four Partners, L.P. and Norcon Power Part-
ners, L.P., both had long-term power purchase agreements with Niagara Mohawk. These
contracts provided for a higher power sales rate in the early portion of the contract and
lower rates in the later periods. When the economics of the agreement did not match
original projections, Niagara threatened to stop its performance on the power purchase
agreements unless the IPPs provided adequate assurances that they would fulfill their re-
spective obligations under the agreements. Ecogen filed the original suit, which Norcon
later joined, seeking among other things a declaratory judgment that the utility had no
grounds to seek adequate assurances from Ecogen. Niagara Mohawk counterclaimed
averring that it did have such grounds. See id. at 59-60.
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serves upstate New York, seeking adequate assurance of future perform-
ance from two IPPs (Ecogen Four Partners, L.P. and Norcon Power Part-
ners, L.P.) under Code section 2-609.7 1 Citing the authority discussed
above, the court stated that the sale of electricity constitutes a service
under New York law and, as a result, rejected applying the Code to the
power purchase agreements. 72 Nevertheless, after extensive litigation on
appeal, Niagara Mohawk won the right to demand adequate assurances
from Norcon. The New York Court of Appeals extended the provisions
of Code section 2-609 to complex commercial contracts not governed di-
rectly by the Code, such as the Norcon-Niagara Mohawk power purchase
agreement. 73
Like Ecogen Four, Rural Elec. Convenience Coop. v. Soyland Power
Coop.74 involved a wholesale transaction rather than a retail sale of elec-
tricity. The plaintiff ("RECC"), an Illinois non-profit cooperative that
distributed electricity to approximately 4,000 customers, entered into an
agreement to purchase all of its electricity from Western Illinois Power
Cooperative, Inc. ("WIPCO").7 5 After WIPCO merged with the defen-
dant, Soyland, RECC sought to terminate its obligations to purchase
electricity from WIPCO/Soyland. RECC based its claim in part on Illi-
nois' Code, which prohibits "the delegation of duties of performance
sales contracts. '76 The court rejected applying the Code in this way "be-
cause the sale of electricity [from Soyland to RECC] ... is not a sale to
the ultimate consumer even if the voltage has been reduced by a trans-
former before it enters RECC's lines and even though it goes through a
meter as RECC receives it."' 77 Thus, the RECC decision apparently
hinged on the fact that this was a wholesale transaction. Moreover, the
71. See id. at 60-61; see also U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (2000) ("When reasonable grounds for
insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may ... demand
adequate assurance of due performance .... ").
72. See Ecogen Four, 914 F. Supp. at 61. The court also noted the irony that Niagara
Mohawk, who successfully argued in Farina, Zoller, and Bowen that electricity was a ser-
vice, now sought the benefit of the Code by claiming that electricity was a good. Id. at 62.
73. See Norcon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 705 N.E.2d 656,
662 (N.Y. 1998). To trace the history of this litigation, see Ecogen Four 914 F. Supp. at 57;
Norcon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. 110 F.3d 6 (2d Cir. 1997)
(Niagara Mohawk's appeal of the Ecogen decision as it related to Norcon); Norcon Power
Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 681 N.E.2d 1293 (N.Y. 1997) (certification
of the question posed by the Second Circuit); Norcon, 705 N.E.2d at 656 (answer to the
certified question); and Norcon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 163
F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998) (employing the New York Court of Appeals answer). Niagara
Mohawk and Norcon eventually resolved their dispute when Niagara bought out the
above-market portion of its contract with Norcon. See NiMo Announces Buyout of Nor-
con Power Contract, ALBANY TIMES-UNION, Dec. 9, 1999.
74. 606 N.E.2d 1269 (I11. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 616 N.E.2d 346 (Il. 1993).
75. See id. at 1270-71.
76. Id. at 1271 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 26, par. 2-210(1)); see also U.C.C. § 2-
210(1) (2000) ("A party may perform his duty through a delegate ... unless the other party
has a substantial interest in having the original promisor perform or control the acts re-
quired by the contract.").
77. Id. at 1275.
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court explicitly rejected the metering distinction that other courts have
used to find the sale of electricity to constitute a good.
ZumBerge v. Northern States Power Co.78 involved damages to the
plaintiffs' cows resulting from stray voltage. 79 Although the trial court
found that electricity constituted a "good" under the Code, "the decision
to treat electricity as subject to [Code] Article 2 [was] a legal question as
yet unsettled in Minnesota. '80 Moreover, the ZumBerge court stated that
the lower court's decision did not control the level of damages that the
ZumBerges could recover. The stray voltage and its resulting damages
"did not 'arise' from [a] transaction [between the parties], but from ac-
tions outside and independent of the transaction." 81 In other words, the
stray voltage involved in the case at bar was distinct from the electricity
that the ZumBerges purchased. The court's unstated conclusion was that
the Code did not apply to the stray voltage. 82
In addition, the court had another reason for not applying the Code to
the case at bar. The court distinguished between a "'commercial transac-
tion' . . . generally defined as a transaction governed by [Code] Article
2"83 and "consumer transactions based on the relative sophistication and
bargaining power of the parties. ' 84 The court further referenced a con-
cern, which the Minnesota Supreme Court previously expressed, that
"Code remedies were inadequate where a consumer lacked bargaining
power."8' 5 As a result, "any 'transaction' between [the parties] should not
fall within the 'commercial transaction' definition as used in Hapka so as
to preclude [the plaintiffs'] recovery on tort theories. '86 Thus, largely for
public policy reasons, the court excluded the ZumBerges' cause of action
from being governed by the Code to allow them to recover for damages
in tort.87
Finally, a superior court of Massachusetts grounded its analysis of
whether electricity is a "good" under the Code in public policy considera-
tions. 88 Specifically, the court evaluated how regulating utilities affected
the policy goals underlying product liability law:
78. 481 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (review denied April 29, 1992).
79. See id. at 105.
80. Id. at 107.
81. Id. at 108.
82. See id.; see also G & K Dairy v. Princeton Elec. Plant Bd., 781 F. Supp. 485, 490
(W.D. Ky. 1991) (holding that "stray voltage is not a 'good,' because: (1) electricity is not a
good; and/or (2) stray voltage does not pass through the customer's meter").
83. ZumBerge, 481 N.W.2d at 107 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 108 (citing Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990)).
85. See ZumBerge, 481 N.W.2d at 108; accord Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 688 ("[W]e con-
tinue to regard the [Code] remedies as something less than adequate in the ordinary con-
sumer transaction.").
86. Id. at 108.
87. Id. The court's discussion related to the Economic Loss Doctrine developed in
Minnesota case and statutory law. For a discussion of this Doctrine's development in Min-
nesota, see Marvin Lumber & Ceder Co. v. PPG Indus., 34 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742-43 (D.
Minn. 1999).
88. See New Balance Athletic Shoes, Inc. v. Boston Edison Co., 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d 397, 398-99 (Mass. Super. 1996).
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The court seeks to protect the public by policing companies who par-
ticipate in the open market. The court accomplishes this policing by
imposing a duty on companies to prevent the release of defective
products onto the market. The reasons underlying this important
role may not be as compelling in cases involving public utilities, since
public utilities in many respects cannot be compared to companies
competing on the open market to sell a product. Public utilities are
subject to stringent regulations .... Thus, public utilities do not slip
easily into the category of companies that require the imposition of
product liability to adequately protect the consumer.89
Based on this reasoning, the court found that electricity did not constitute
a good.90 Thus, a power surge that caused a fire at the plaintiff's facility
did not constitute a breach of the Code's warranty provisions.91
As this review of cases demonstrates, courts have presented a variety
of reasons for why the Code should not govern the sale of electricity.
These rationales range from a straightforward application of the pre-
meter/post-meter test to more complex approaches concerning the char-
acteristics of electricity or the nature of the interaction between a utility
and its customers or suppliers. The variety of rationales, as well as causes
of action, found in these cases reflects the component roles that utilities
traditionally have performed: generation, transmission, and distribution.
As these roles are separated from each other in the deregulated environ-
ment, strictly adhering to a single position, such as New York courts have
done, may no longer be appropriate.
C. RELATED PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES
The issues raised by applying the Code to the sale of electricity are
similar to those involved in product liability cases. The concepts "prod-
uct" and "good" are nearly synonymous. As a result, plaintiffs in many
cases have sought recovery under both product liability and Code-based
claims.92 Moreover, courts have used their analysis for one type of claim
in addressing the other.93 Electricity product liability cases are more
prevalent, and more studied,94 than Code-based cases. While not all the-
ories addressed in these cases should be used in a Code-based analysis, 95
89. Id. at 399 (quotations and citations omitted).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Farina, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 646-47.
93. See, e.g., Bellotti, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1394-95
94. See, e.g., Roger W. Holmes, Note, Strict Products Liability for Electric Utility Com-
panies: A Surge in the Wrong Direction, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 161 (1995); Louis Law-
rence Boyle, Comment, Electrifying Solutions for the Shocking and Disparate Treatment of
Electricity Within Product Liability Law, 93 DICK. L. REV. 851 (1989); Allen L. Rutz, Com-
ment, After the Meter: Energy Products Liability in a Deregulated Environment, 26 CAP. U.
L. REV. 421 (1997).
95. For example, the stream of commerce theory is one of the principle approaches
used in electricity product liability cases. One particular variation of this theme holds that
"an electric utility's mere placement of electricity into the stream of commerce suffices for
a products liability action." Holmes, supra note 94, at 179. Moreover, some courts have
held that "electricity may enter the stream of commerce when the electric company relin-
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one can examine product liability cases to understand better the argu-
ments used in determining whether electricity is a good under the Code.
Two product liability cases in particular can flush out the discussion
above regarding the characteristics and properties of electricity. In Ran-
some v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.,96 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
provided an often-cited passage in which the court concluded that elec-
tricity is a product:
While there probably are numerous technical definitions of "electric-
ity," we need not be concerned with those accurate descriptions here
suffice it to say it is a form of energy that can be made or produced
by men, confined, controlled, transmitted and distributed to be used
as an energy source for heat, power and light and is distributed in the
stream of commerce. The distribution might well be a service, but
the electricity itself, in the contemplation of the ordinary user, is a
consumable product.97
In this passage, not only did the Ransome court lay out what it consid-
ered electricity's relevant characteristics, it also analytically unbundled
electricity from the other roles that a regulated utility played. It viewed a
utility's function in generating electricity separate and distinct from its
T&D roles.
On the other end of the spectrum, in Otte v. Dayton Power & Light
Co.,98 the Supreme Court of Ohio viewed electricity as falling outside the
definition of the term "product," which is "anything made by human in-
dustry or art." 99 The court found that the utility did not manufacture the
electricity.'00 Instead, it merely put "in motion the necessary elements
that allow the flow" of electrically charged particles.101 Moreover, the
electric charges that the utility releases at its generating stations are sig-
nificantly different than those that the end-user receives. 102 Specifically,
the electricity's voltage is stepped-up so it can be transmitted across high
voltage power lines and then stepped-down to be distributed to the con-
sumer. Thus, "electric power cannot be considered a product intended to
reach the consumer in the same condition in which it is released at a
power plant.' 10 3
quishes exclusive control over its product." Aversa v. Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 451
A.2d 976, 980 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982). While this line of reasoning may be appro-
priate for a product liability case, it likely would fail in a Code-based claim. The Code does
not focus on whether the seller has exclusive control, but instead on whether the good has
been identified to a contract for sale, as required by U.C.C. § 2-105. See infra Part Il(B)(3)
regarding identifying electricity to a contract.
96. Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 275 N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 1979).
97. Id. at 643.
98. Otte v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 523 N.E.2d 835 (Ohio 1988).
99. Id. at 838.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. See id at 839.
103. Id. (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b), which requires a
product to reach the end-user "without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold"). The Otte court considered other characteristics of electricity. The Bowen court in
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11. DECIPHERING THE RELEVANT RULES
A. INCORRECT AND INCOMPLETE ANALYSES
As the discussion above shows, courts have used numerous rationales
or criteria for deciding whether electricity is a good or service. But not all
the criteria were used correctly, particularly in applying the Code. Before
one can properly decide whether electricity is a good, the incorrect ratio-
nales that some courts have employed need to be dismissed. In addition,
numerous courts have used analytical short-cuts to reach otherwise cor-
rect results. For example, they have not explicitly provided the legal the-
ory underlying their analysis or have made unstated leaps in logic. By
doing this, these cases leave open the possibility that subsequent judges
may misinterpret their precedent, thus potentially leading to developing
more incorrect legal doctrines. Thus, the incomplete analyses need to be
flushed out completely.
First, the Code does not distinguish between the type of end-user, or
whether the transaction is at the wholesale or retail level. Code Section
2-103(1)(a) defines the term "buyer" to mean "a person who buys or con-
tracts to buy goods. 104 Thus, the ZumBerge court's distinction between
commercial and consumer transactions'0 5 is inappropriate. The Code
covers consumer transactions as well as sophisticated commercial transac-
tions.' 06 The ZumBerge court worked around the scope of the Code's
"buyer" definition by finding that stray voltage was not part of the trans-
action between the ZumBerges and the utility.107 But the court's com-
mercial/consumer distinction is without basis in the Code. If the sale of
electricity constitutes a sale of goods, then the buyer of the electricity is
irrelevant; the Code should govern that transaction.
Similarly, the RECC court should not have rejected applying the Code
on the grounds that the sale was not to the "ultimate consumer."' 0 8 The
Code does not require "buyers" of goods to use them for their own ends,
but allows buyers to become sellers later. A wholesale transaction be-
tween two power companies or cooperatives, such as the one in RECC,
should be viewed as a sale between merchants. 10 9 The Code defines the
term "merchant" in part as "a person who deals in goods of the kind...
involved in the transaction."' 1'0 In RECC, both cooperatives dealt in
New York incorporated a portion of this analysis. See discussion supra notes 65-68 and
accompanying text.
104. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(a) (2000).
105. See ZumBerge, 481 N.W.2d at 108.
106. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (3d ed.) § 1.10, at 38 (1999) ("Thus the
Uniform Commercial Code ... does not exclude consumers.").
107. See ZumBerge, 481 N.W.2d at 108.
108. RECC, 606 N.E.2d at 1275.
109. Along the same lines, the power purchase agreements in dispute in the Ecogen
Four/Norcon cases also would be considered a sale between merchants if New York courts
applied the Code to the sale of electricity. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
110. The complete definition of a "merchant" is:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
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electricity-in terms of both their specific contract as well as generally.
The Code clearly intended to incorporate sales between merchants within
its scope, as indicated by the fact that certain provisions apply only in
such transactions.11
A second erroneous line of reasoning relates to how some courts de-
scribed the kilowatt-hour as a measure of a customer's electricity usage.
Both the Otte and Bowen courts regarded the kilowatt-hour as a time
measurement.112 Consumers paid the utility based on the length of time
that they used electricity; thus, they effectively were paying for an hourly
service. This understanding of the kilowatt-hour, however, is incorrect.
Despite what the term may imply, the kilowatt-hour does not measure
the time of usage, but instead the amount of electricity used.
A kilowatt-hour can be defined as "[t]he basic unit of electric energy
equal to one Kilowatt of power supplied to an electric circuit steadily for
one hour. 1 a3 The equivalent amount of energy can be calculated in
many other ways: two Kilowatts supplied for one-half hour, three Kilo-
watts supplied for 20 minutes, etc. The energy provider, therefore, is not
compensated by the time it supplies energy, but instead the quantity.
None other than Thomas Edison, the father of the electrical distribution
system, understood this fact: "I had to devise a system of metering elec-
tricity ... so that I could measure the amount of electricity used by each
consumer. 11 4 This proper view corrects the Otte/Bowen courts' misun-
derstanding of the kilowatt-hour and works to negate their argument that
electricity is a service. Moreover, it actually supports the view that elec-
tricity is a good. Because electricity can be described in quantified
amounts, it can be more easily identified to a contract as required under
Code section 2-105.
Third, courts must be careful to specify why the pre-metered form of
electricity may not be a good under the Code. The key reason is that
electricity in the power lines probably has not been identified to a con-
tract, as required under the Code. But the court in Singer Co. v. Balti-
more Gas & Elec. Co., for example, improperly relied on the argument
that such electricity had not "been converted into a useable state.""aa5
Similarly, in Farina, the court considered electricity in the power lines to
involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be at-
tributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who
by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2000).
111. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (2000) ("Between merchants. ); see also FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 106, at 37.
112. See Bowen, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32 (quoting Otte); Otte, 523 N.E.2d at 838 ("[Con-
sumers] pay for each kilowatt hour provided. Thus, consumers are charged for the length
of time electricity flows through their electrical systems.").
113. State of New York Department of Public Service, A Glossary of Terms Used by
Utilities and Their Regulators, available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/glossary.html. It is
equal to approximately 3,450 Btu. See id.
114. Quoted in JAMES A. Cox, A CENTURY OF LIGHT 28 (1979) (emphasis added).
115. Singer Co., 558 A.2d at 424.
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not be in a "marketable state."' 116
The distinction of whether electricity is in a marketable state is essen-
tial in a product liability case.117 But the official comment to the Code's
provision regarding identification states "there is no requirement in this
section that the goods be in a deliverable state or that all of the seller's
duties with respect to the processing of the goods be completed in order
that identification occur." 118 Thus, the fact that electricity may not be in
a usable form does not preclude the Code from governing the transac-
tion; it indicates only that the seller may not have fulfilled all of its con-
tractual obligations. Moreover, nothing in the Code prevents parties
from agreeing that electricity in its unusable state, while still in a utility's
power lines, will be identified to a contract. Absent such a specific agree-
ment that defines when the electricity is identified, however, metering
provides the best method to identify electricity to a contract. Thus, the
fact that electricity may not be marketable at any certain point is not
relevant for a Code-based analysis; what matters is whether electricity is
identified to a contract. The pre-metered distinction speaks to this
element.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, courts generally have failed to
address the point that the sale of electricity from a regulated utility in-
volves a sales-service hybrid transaction. The sale of electricity includes
something that resembles a product and that is consumed by end-users.
It also includes the necessary services of transmitting the electricity from
generating stations and distributing it to those consumers. Although
most courts have not discussed the sale of electricity in terms of a hybrid
transaction, they have implicitly employed standard analytical tools in de-
ciding whether the Code applied.
The primary means for assessing whether Article 2 of the Code should
govern a sales-service transaction is the "predominant factor" test, where
a court will consider which component of the transaction-the goods or
the service-is dominant. 1 9 Thus, if the sale of goods were the dominant
component, then the Code would apply. Conversely, Article 2 would not
apply if the service were the predominant factor in the transaction.
Although many commercial transactions may fall clearly toward one
component or the other, some transactions fall within a gray area. 120 In
such situations, Professor Hawkland suggests that "it might be more sen-
sible and facilitate administration ... to abandon the 'predominant fac-
tor' test and focus instead on whether the gravamen of the action involves
goods or services.' 121 That is, if the essential part of the plaintiff's com-
116. Farina, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 646 (citations omitted).
117. See, e.g., Genaust, 343 N.E.2d at 470 ("[T]he doctrine of strict liability was not
intended to encompass injuries resulting from a 'product' which is in an unmarketable
state .. .
118. U.C.C. § 2-501 cmt. 5 (2000).
119. See 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102:4 (1998).
120. See id.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
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plaint stems from a defective good, for example, then the Code would
govern that complaint; if the complaint involves service-related damages,
the Code would not apply in that situation.12 2 Thus, the gravamen test is
fact-specific and requires determining the primary cause of the plaintiff's
damages.
As noted above, some courts seemingly have used the principles under-
lying the predominant factor and gravamen tests to analyze the sale of
electricity without adopting them explicitly.12 3 For example, in both
Helvey and Bellotti, the sale of electricity constituted a good despite the
fact that the cause of action stemmed from service-related problems (ex-
cess voltage and a power surge respectively). 12 4 To reach this result, the
courts must have believed that the sale of the goods dominated the utili-
ties' distribution services within the transaction. Otherwise, the appropri-
ate issue before the court would have been whether the utility was
negligent in delivering the electricity. Thus, these cases represent an im-
plicit use of the predominant factor test.
Along the same lines, the ZumBerge court distinguished that the plain-
tiffs' cause of action stemmed from the utility's "failure to control ...
injurious stray voltage."'21 5 Thus, the complaint rested outside the sale of
electricity and related to Northern States Power's T&D services. In other
words, even though the trial court held that the sale of electricity consti-
tuted a transaction in goods, the gravamen of the complaint was based on
a service. Therefore, the Code did not apply.
One should note that these courts did not necessarily decide the cases
incorrectly. But the lesson to be culled from these decisions is that a
court should be more precise and explicit in its analysis. The rationales
underlying these decisions will be employed in new contexts as the energy
industry deregulates. Thus, even though the conclusions in these cases
may be right, one's ability to use them to analyze disputes that will arise
in the deregulated context is limited unless one also considers the under-
lying basis for the decisions.
122. Hawkland uses as an example the case of Worrell v. Barnes, 484 P.2d 573 (Nev.
1971), in which the plaintiff sued for damages caused by a fire. The fire stemmed from a
gas leak from a valve that connected a propane tank to a water heater that the defendant
installed. Hawkland states that if the court in Worrell employed the gravamen test, then "if
the gas escaped because of a defective fitting or connector, the case might be characterized
as one involving the sale of goods. On the other hand, if the gas escaped because of poor
work by Barnes the case might be characterized as one involving services, outside the
scope of the UCC." HAWKLAND, supra note 119, at § 2-102:4.
123. But cf. Cincinnati Gas, 502 N.E.2d at 714. Here, the court started its analysis by
stating that "the test for the inclusion in or the exclusion from the scope of the term 'goods'
is whether the predominant factor and purpose of the contract is the rendition of service
with goods incidentally involved or whether the contract is for the sale of goods with ser-
vice incidentally involved" (emphasis added). The court's analysis, however, did not turn
on the dominant essence of the transaction, but instead on whether post-metered electric-
ity was a good.
124. Bellotti, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1394-95; Helvey, 278 N.E.2d at 609-10.
125. ZumBerge, 481 N.W.2d at 108.
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B. RELEVANT RATIONALES REGARDING THE SALE OF ELECTRICITY
Surprisingly enough, no court has worked through the Code's three el-
ements defining a good (a thing, movable, and identifiable) to determine
whether electricity satisfies those elements. The Helvey court came clos-
est to accomplishing this task, when it noted that electricity must be "(1)
a thing; (2) existing; and (3) movable, with (2) and (3) existing simultane-
ously.' 1 26 But Helvey's requirement that electricity exist is not the same
as it being identifiable.127 A thing can exist without it being identifiable,
a good example being the wind. Being identifiable implies that the thing
has a tangible quality, thus excluding intangible items from the Code's
coverage. 128 Therefore, while Helvey's cursory overview is a useful start-
ing place, the issue of whether the Code governs the sale of electricity,
considered separately from T&D services, requires a more systematic
analysis of the elements of a good.
1. Is Electricity a Thing?
The term "thing" provides a vague standard for understanding how to
satisfy this element. One could presume that this term was intended to
be interpreted fairly broadly, and therefore does not necessarily present a
significant barrier to applying the Code to a transaction. For example,
the Helvey court did not even discuss whether electricity was a "thing,"
instead focusing its attention on the other elements of a good.
The "thing" element would seem to be designed to exclude services
from the Code's scope. But providing electricity clearly is not solely a
service, since the customers consume the electricity that comes into their
homes or businesses. 129 Therefore, some other basis must be found if
electricity is to fail to satisfy the Code's requirement that it be a "thing"-
and that basis may be that electricity is not sufficiently tangible to be
considered a "thing" within the Code's scope.
As noted above, the Code seeks to circumscribe the scope of transac-
tions in tangible goods. 130 Therefore, if electricity cannot be considered
tangible, then it cannot be a good. Thus, the Code would not govern its
sale. The existing case law provides only a narrow basis for determining
whether electricity is tangible. Two products liability cases have summa-
126. Helvey, 278 N.E.2d at 610.
127. The Helvey court apparently blended Code sections 2-105(1) and 2-105(2). The
former sets forth the definition of a good, which requires it to be a thing, moveable, and
identified to a contract. The latter conditions the passing of interest in goods on their
being existing and identifiable. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1)-(2) (2000).
128. The Code's "purpose is to avoid making practical issues between practical [people]
turn upon the location of an intangible something." U.C.C. § 2-101 cmt. (2000) (emphasis
added). See also HAWKLAND, supra note 119, at § 2-105:2 ("The exclusion of 'things in
action' and the inclusion of 'things which are movable' suggests that Section 2-105 limits
goods to tangible personal property.").
129. Providing electricity, at least in the context of a vertically integrated utility, is best
seen as a sales-service hybrid transaction. See supra note 32, and notes 119-22 and accom-
panying text.
130. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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rily described electricity's nature as "intangible. ' 131 For the most part,
however, courts have not addressed this point directly.
Arguments can be made on both sides of this point. On one hand,
electricity may be considered as an invisible force that stems from electri-
cally charged particles. Indeed, the full definition of electricity found in
Ballentine's Law Dictionary (cited in part in Farina132) is: "A subtle
agency that pervades all successful definition. A dangerous, invisible,
subtle, silent, deadly, and instantaneous force. ' 133 It is akin to a magnetic
force; their effects can be seen, but the actual phenomenon itself can-
not.134 Clearly, one would not consider magnetism to be a good because
of its intangible qualities. Using the same line of reasoning, electricity
should not be considered a tangible good.
Although this reasoning may have a certain intuitive appeal, it does
have limitations as well. While electricity may not be seen, it "can be felt
and otherwise observed. 1 35 Moreover, one could argue that if tangibility
is defined in terms of having the ability to be perceived by the senses,
then electricity is tangible and should be a good under the Code. 136 Per-
haps the most distinguishing fact in determining electricity's nature is that
it can be measured (i.e., otherwise observed) through the use of a meter.
Unlike other natural forces like magnetism or the wind, which can be
measured only indirectly through its force or speed, one can meaningfully
and directly quantify the amount of electricity that passes through a
meter.1 37 Thus, even though one may believe electricity to be an evasive
and invisible force, the better reasoned approach is to consider electricity
to be tangible.
Moreover, the legal argument that electricity is not tangible would not
stand up against the weight of judicial authority. Regardless of Ballen-
tine's artful definition, electricity has specific physical properties that
would bring it within the Code's requirement that it be a "thing."'1 38
Even those courts that have not found electricity to be a product or a
good would not dispute that it is, at least, a "thing." For example, the
131. See Elgin Airport Inn, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410 N.E.2d 620, 623 (I11.
App. Ct. 1980) ("Because electricity is intangible, . . . the intangible force of electrical
current is not a 'product'."), rev'd on other grounds, Elgin Airport Inn, Inc. v. Common-
wealth Edison Co., 432 N.E.2d 259, 262 (Ill. 1982) ("[T]here is no need to consider the
more fundamental questions ... , such as whether electricity is a product at all .. ");
Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 234 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) ("[W]e note
that the 'product' involved in this case is not a tangible item like an automobile ....
Rather, it is a form of energy ... .
132. See supra note 59.
133. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 395 (3d ed. 1969) (emphasis added).
134. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 114, at 22 (In 1600, William Gilbert published a book
stating the fundamentals of magnetism, calling the mysterious force "electrica.").
135. HAWKLAND, supra note 119, at § 2-105:2.
136. See id.
137. This fact highlights the importance of understanding what a kilowatt-hour mea-
sures. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
138. Consider the more technical definition of electricity in Webster's Dictionary: "a
property of certain fundamental particles of all matter .... WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 436 (3d ed. 1997).
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Otte and Bowen courts referred to electricity as electrically charged parti-
cles.139 In Singer Co., the court distinguished between raw voltage and
the "refined product" customers buy.140 This distinction would not make
sense if electricity were merely a natural force; that is, electricity could
not be a "raw" force as well as be found in a "refined" state. Finally, in
Austin v. Public Serv. Co. of Northern Ill.,141 the case from which Ballen-
tine's derived its definition, the Illinois Supreme Court referred to elec-
tricity as a commodity. 142 Given these views, electricity would seem to
fall clearly within the Code's first element for determining whether it is a
good.
2. Is Electricity Moveable?
This element of a good is the easiest for electricity to satisfy.' 43 No
court has rejected applying the Code to electricity on the grounds that it
is not movable. Moreover, even the Otte court described electricity as the
"flow" of electrically charged particles. 144 This "flow" reflects that some-
thing is moving from the generating station across the power lines and
into the customers' homes and businesses. Therefore, one should con-
clude that electricity meets the Code's element of being movable.
3. Is Electricity Identifiable to a Contract?
To some degree, the issue of electricity's tangible qualities also affects
the analysis of whether electricity can be identified to a contract. If elec-
tricity is not tangible, it likely cannot be identifiable. The discussion
above addressed this question of tangibility in some detail and need not
be repeated here. Suffice it to say, since electricity itself can be mea-
sured, it should be considered to have enough tangible qualities that al-
low it to be identified to a contract. The key question, therefore, is how
and when does electricity become identifiable.
The fact that the sale of electricity can be measured by using a meter
establishes an easy means to identify electricity to a contract. The meter
measures the amount of electrical current either generated at a power
plant and released into the distribution system, or consumed by a cus-
tomer. Moreover, the meter generally is positioned at or near the point
that divides two parties' property interests. 145 This placement also pro-
139. Bowen, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32; Otte, 523 N.E.2d at 838 (emphasis added).
140. Singer Co., 558 A.2d at 424.
141. Austin v. Public Serv. Co. of Northern Ill., 132 N.E. 458 (I11. 1921).
142. Id. at 460.
143. This element also is important to the Code's conception of a good: "The definition
of goods is based on the concept of movability .. " U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 1 (2000).
144. Otte, 523 N.E.2d at 838.
145. For example, the meter at most residences is located on an outside wall of the
house and is connected to the utility's distribution line. Furthermore, contracts between
IPPs and utilities often will require that the meter be located at the point where the IPP
delivers the electricity into the utility's transmission system. Moreover, if the meter is not
located at that specific point, the meter readings will be adjusted to offset for line losses of
electricity that invariably happen. See, e.g., Agreement Between Fourth Branch Associates
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vides a convenient location where the risk of loss can switch from one
party to the other, an issue that is particularly important at the wholesale
transaction level.146 Thus, electricity would seem to be identifiable to a
contract at the point where a meter measures it.
This conclusion, taken with the conclusion that electricity is both a
thing and is movable, leads one to find that electricity meets the Code's
definition of a good as specified in section 2-105. Certainly, a court could
reject this conclusion based on a finding that electricity is intangible. But
this analysis has shown that most of the premises used to reject applying
the Code to the sale of electricity either (1) have been incorrect, or (2)
are not as strong as the arguments supporting the use of the Code. While
other factors need to be assessed to determine ultimately whether to ap-
ply the Code, electricity has met the fundamental threshold issue: it
should be considered a good.
4. Assessing the Effect of Code Section 2-314
Although electricity would appear to satisfy the Code's definition of
"goods," other Code sections may affect whether and how the Code
should apply to the sale of electricity. As the earlier review of cases
demonstrated, some courts have rejected applying the Code because elec-
tricity failed to meet specific elements of certain sections. 147 The most
significant of these cases was Navarro County, where the court concluded
that electricity failed to meet the Code's statutory elements for
merchantability in section 2-314.148 This Code section provides that
"[u]nless excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall be mer-
chantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind. 1 49 Apparently, the Navarro County
and Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. I TENTH (May 7, 1987) (on file with author). This
contractual language reads in part "ELECTRICITY delivered by SELLER hereunder
shall be measured by electric watt hour meters .... If the meters are located at a point
other than the Point of Delivery, the readings will be adjusted for losses between the me-
tering location and the Point of Delivery." Many state regulatory agencies make power
purchase agreements like this one available for public review and copying.
146. See the discussion in the previous footnote regarding adjusting for line losses.
147. Although this portion of the Comment focuses on Code section 2-314, courts also
have rejected applying other provisions of the Code to the sale of electricity. For example,
the Farina court rejected applying section 2-318 regarding third party beneficiaries of war-
ranties on the grounds that a sale had not occurred after the plaintiff's husband touched a
power line; therefore, the utility was not a seller as required in that section. This analysis,
however, appears to use implicitly the gravamen test. Specifically, because the essence of
the cause of action stemmed from the utility's service-related functions (i.e., the location of
its transmission lines) instead of its sale of goods functions, the Code would not apply to
this transaction. But since New York seemingly has rejected the use of the gravamen test
(see HAWKLAND, supra note 119, at § 2-102:4), the Farina court needed to find some other
way to reach its conclusion regarding the plaintiff's Section 2-318 claim.
148. Navarro County, 640 S.W.2d at 399. As discussed supra at notes 41-50 and accom-
panying text, the Navarro County finding that electricity is a service was overturned in a
products liability case. But the Navarro County court's analysis regarding whether electric-
ity can meet the Code's definition of merchantability is a useful analytical tool for deter-
mining whether the Code should apply to the sale of electricity.
149. U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2000).
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court assumed that if a good were incapable of ever satisfying the Code's
implied warranty of merchantability, then transactions in those goods
should not be covered by the Code.
Section 2-314 sets out six criteria for determining merchantability:
passing without objection; in the case of fungible goods, being of fair av-
erage quality; being fit for ordinary purposes; running of even kind; being
adequately packaged and labeled if required; and conforming to promises
made on any labeling.150 The Navarro County court claimed that electric-
ity "certainly could not be classified as fungible goods nor is there any
way to adequately package or label electrical energy;"'151 thus, electricity
apparently failed to satisfy the elements of merchantability. This analysis,
however, is incorrect. The Code does not require goods to be fungible or
packaged, as the Navarro County court implied. Instead, it sets forth cer-
tain conditional requirements that must be satisfied if, in fact, the goods
are fungible or packaged.
Consider the Code's language. Section 2-314(2)(b) starts "in the case
of fungible goods."'152 This language implies that certain goods are fungi-
ble while others are not; but the Code covers both types of goods. The
provisions regarding packaging and labeling contain similar conditional
language. Section 2-314(2)(e) refers to packaging and labeling "as the
agreement may require."'1 53 Similarly, section 2-314(2)(f) addresses
promises "made on the container or label if any."1t 54 Once again, these
provisions inform a merchant of goods of what it would need to do if any
packaging or labeling either were required or provided. But they do not
preclude a good from being subject to the Code merely because it is not
or cannot be packaged.
Thus, the Navarro County line of reasoning has been refuted. But that
still leaves a basic issue to address: whether electricity is capable of meet-
ing the definition of merchantability, provided that the elements of
merchantability are analyzed correctly. The Code acknowledges the war-
ranty of merchantability's importance, noting that it "is so commonly
taken for granted that its exclusion from the contract is a matter threaten-
ing surprise."' 55  Therefore, let us consider the elements of
150. U.C.C. § 2-314(2) reads in full:
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as: (a) pass without objec-
tion in the trade under the contract description; and (b) in the case of fungi-
ble goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and (c) are fit for
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and (d) run, within the
variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity
within each unit and among all units involved; and (e) are adequately con-
tained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and (f) conform
to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
151. Navarro County, 640 S.W.2d at 400.
152. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(b) (2000).
153. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(e) (2000). The Code's official comment adds that this paragraph
"applies only where the nature of goods and of the transaction require a certain type of
container, package or label." U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 10 (2000).
154. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(f) (2000) (emphasis added).
155. U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 11 (2000).
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merchantability as they relate to electricity.
The Code directs that the first two paragraphs in section 2-314(2)
should be read together.156 Regardless of whether electricity is fungi-
ble,157 electricity is capable of passing without objection and of being of
fair average quality. Indeed, these elements are met every time a home-
owner turns on a light switch, an office worker runs a computer, or a
manufacturer operates a massive industrial processing system without
any incident. If electricity could not meet these requirements, even daily
activities like these could not be done. This same reasoning applies to
subparagraphs (c) and (d) regarding being fit for ordinary purposes and
running of even kind. Finally, as already discussed, electricity does not
need to be packaged or labeled to satisfy the Code's definition of
merchantability. 158 Thus, the sale of electricity can be said to satisfy the
listed components of merchantability.
Perhaps the more interesting question to consider is whether the sale of
electricity, considered separately from T&D services, can ever violate any
criteria of merchantability. Or, to put it more simply, is there such a thing
as defective electricity in the way that one may buy a broken television,
for example. If electricity may not ever breach the warranty of
merchantability, would that preclude applying the Code to its sale?
The quality of electricity-that is, the good itself-does not vary. At its
essence, electricity is merely charged particles; the Otte court stated this
premise correctly. Those particles do not vary in terms of whether they
are "good electricity" or "bad electricity." They simply constitute
"electricity."
The case law that has addressed the Code's warranty of
merchantability section has done so in the context of service related
problems: stray voltage, power surges, excess electricity, etc. The issue
regarding section 2-314 becomes this: if the sale of electricity is unbun-
dled from the T&D services, an injured party's cause of action would be
against the entity that delivered the electricity. As a result, the Code's
warranty of merchantability would be effectively negated as to the sale of
electricity because it would never violate the components of
merchantability listed in section 2-314. Thus, one could argue that, given
156. U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 7 (2000).
157. U.C.C. § 1-201(17) (2000) defines fungible as "goods ... of which any unit is, by
nature or usage of trade, the equivalent of any other like unit." On one hand, the Navarro
County court summarily dismissed electricity as not being fungible. But one could make
the argument that one unit (e.g., one kilowatt-hour) of electricity is like any other. There-
fore, electricity should be considered fungible.
158. The issue of whether electricity is adequately packaged or contained usually arises
when a person makes contact with a power line. See, e.g., Navarro County, 640 S.W.2d at
399. By unbundling the delivery of electricity from the sale of the good, one sees that
issues relating to power lines would fall upon the entity that transmits and distributes elec-
tricity, and not the one who sells electricity. Thus, injuries arising from contact with a
power line should be considered as a potential tort action, not a breach of implied warranty
of merchantability.
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the importance of this section, 159 since section 2-314 would not apply to
the unbundled sale of electricity, then such transactions should not be
governed by the Code.
While this argument (i.e., there is no such thing as "defective electric-
ity") may start from a meritorious premise, the legal conclusion that the
Code should not govern the unbundled sale of electricity does not neces-
sary follow. First, as discussed above, section 2-314's primary objective-
for goods to be merchantable-is met by the unbundled sale of electric-
ity; the claims that are likely to arise stem from T&D services. Second,
while the warranty of merchantability is important in transactions of
goods, it is not required to complete a sale. Certainly, the Code itself
limits the implied warranty of merchantability only to sales in which the
seller is a merchant.160 In addition, it provides that the warranty of
merchantability can be expressly modified or excluded from any
transaction.' 6'
But even if the warranty of merchantability were not specifically ex-
cluded from a transaction involving a merchant as the seller, the Code's
commentary would seem to imply that the warranty must not necessarily
be imputed into every transaction. For example, comment 11 to section 2-
314 reads: "The warranty of merchantability, wherever it is normal.' 62
This statement would seem to indicate that in certain transactions the
warranty of merchantability is not normal, and therefore section 2-314
would not apply. Such would be the case with the unbundled sale of
electricity.
Moreover, comment 13 starts: "In an action based on breach of war-
ranty, it is of course necessary to show not only the existence of the war-
ranty.' 63 In addition, comment 2 notes that the definition of
merchantability varies from trade to trade and that "[t]he question when
the warranty is imposed turns basically on the meaning of the terms of
the agreement as recognized in the trade."' 64 Once again, the logical in-
ference stemming from these statements would appear to be that for cer-
tain transactions the implied warranty of merchantability does not exist.
Given this commentary, the Code seems to indicate that for a narrow
band of transactions of goods sold by a merchant, section 2-314 does not
apply. But the remaining Code provisions, where applicable, would gov-
ern the transaction. Thus, to summarize, the question of how and
whether section 2-314 should apply to the sale of electricity should not
preclude the Code from governing such transactions generally.
159. See U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 11 (2000) ("The warranty of merchantability, wherever it
is normal, is so commonly taken for granted .... ).
160. See U.C.C. § 2-314(a) (2000) ("[A] warranty that the goods shall be merchantable
is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind.") (emphasis added).
161. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2000) (Exclusion or Modification of Warranties).
162. U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 11 (2000).
163. U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 13 (2000) (emphasis added).
164. U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 2 (2000).
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III. LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE
DEREGULATION OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY
As discussed in the previous section, the better-reasoned legal analysis
is that electricity should be considered a good and that the Code should
govern its sale. Courts have not only had to address this legal question,
but also the policy considerations of either applying or not applying the
Code to the sale of electricity. 165 The intersection between legal and pol-
icy considerations will take on a greater meaning as states throughout the
nation address the policy decision of whether to deregulate the energy
industry within their borders.
A. OVERVIEW: THE STATUS OF DEREGULATION
Although a comprehensive review of the move toward deregulation is
beyond the scope of this Comment, an overview of the efforts to date will
provide a useful context for understanding the issues that likely will arise
regarding the sale of electricity in a deregulated industry. The current
movement to allow consumers to choose their energy supplier has its
roots in the 1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act ("PURPA"). 166
Although PURPA has been criticized for contributing to higher energy
costs, 16 7 it also has fostered the development of the independent power
industry.1 68 With this industry now matured, many IPPs can generate
electricity at a lower cost than utilities.
Other federal legislative and regulatory decisions have laid a further
foundation for deregulating the energy industry.169 These efforts gener-
ally have loosened some regulations for utilities and IPPs so as to make it
easier for them to engage in selling their electricity at the wholesale level.
On the retail level, however, although numerous bills calling for the der-
egulation of the industry have been introduced in Congress,170 none have
become law. Leading supporters, however, have continued to push for
comprehensive federal legislation that would allow all consumers to
165. See, e.g., New Balance, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 398-99.
166. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).
167. For example, several bills over the years have been introduced in Congress to
amend the bill to address this problem. See, e.g., H.R. 1587, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1828,
106th Cong. (1999); and S. 1047, 106th Cong. (1999).
168. Among other things, PURPA requires utilities to purchase electricity from "quali-
fying facilities" ("QFs") at their avoided costs. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (1994). This provision
provided a guaranteed market to QFs at the wholesale level, even though they were pre-
cluded from selling directly to consumers. Avoided costs are a utility's "cost of either gen-
erating the electricity itself or purchasing it from another source." Ecogen, 914 F. Supp. at
59.
169. See, e.g., Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discrimi-
natory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996) (Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Order 888); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776
(1992) (easing restrictions on QFs and establishing Exempt Wholesale Generators).




choose their electricity supplier. 171
In lieu of federal legislation, the decision to deregulate and to allow
consumer choice has been made on a state-by-state basis. As Figure 1
shows, the states can be grouped into three categories. A number of
states have decided to deregulate the energy industry within their bor-
ders. Generally, these are states where the cost of electricity was well
above the national average, including California, New York, and Massa-
chusetts. Several states already allow energy consumers their choice in
suppliers, while others either have started to open up retail sales to com-
petition or will do so shortly. Either way, consumers will have their
choice within the next few years.





C3 No action (14)
Source: Compiled from National Association of Regulatory Commissioners' Energy Re-
structuring Database
Note: "By 2000" means that all energy customers have their choice in energy supplier by
December 31, 2000. "After 2000" means that all energy users will be allowed to choose
their supplier on some date after December 31, 2000, even if some customers already have
that choice at the end of the year 2000.
On the other end of the spectrum, a number of states have not em-
braced the concept of deregulation. In many cases, the state already may
171. For example, Rep. Tom Bliley (R-VA), Chair of the House Committee on Com-
merce in the 106th Congress, testified before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power that
"We have a duty to give consumers access to more choices and lower prices. To deny them
this would be wrong." House of Representatives Committee on Commerce, Bliley State-
ment on Electricity Competition: State and Local Issues, available at http://com-notes.house.
gov/cchear/hearingsl06.nsf/8eaabcee3eeO7ee852566f9070fOd/aOb27b5f5cc5944852567
al004abed?OpenDocument (Press release dated July 1, 1999).
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have low energy costs and is concerned that deregulation would result in
increased rates. 172 In others, specific circumstances limit the ability to
deregulate the industry in the immediate future. For example, Hawaii's
geography makes it very difficult to develop a competitive generating in-
dustry.173 Or consider Nebraska where all the electricity currently comes
from public power.174
Finally, within this spectrum are other states that have considered der-
egulating the energy industry within their borders, but have not yet made
the decision to do so. The support for deregulation in these states varies
as well ranging from almost certainly going to deregulate in the next leg-
islative session to a highly skeptical studying of the issues. Thus, the
state-by-state decision to deregulate has resulted in a mixed collection of
policies and approaches to addressing energy costs.
B. POLICY ISSUES
As seen above, the concept of "deregulating the energy industry" is not
as comprehensive as the term might imply. In fact, for several states, the
deregulation decision has meant deliberately maintaining the existing
vertical-utility-monopoly structure that thus far has produced low-cost
power. Therefore, considering the policy issues of applying the Code to
the sale of electricity in a deregulated industry requires examining two
different policy environments: those states that will allow consumer
choice and those that will not.
1. Deregulated States
Many states have decided to deregulate the energy industry in an effort
to reduce power costs for industry, business, and consumers. Thus, one
policy issue for a state to consider is which legal framework will facilitate
lower cost power: the Code or that state's statutory and common law of
contracts. Admittedly, this question may be answered only in an abstract,
theoretical sense. Assume, however, that energy generators will factor
uncertainty into the price at which they will be willing to sell their elec-
tricity-that is, the more uncertainty a generator may face, the greater its
sale price will be. In this regard, the Code generally provides a more
certain and well-known set of rules for governing contracts than non-
Code contract law. Thus, all things being equal, a generator selling under
the Code would have marginally lower risk than one not governed by the
172. For example, the average cost in the State of Washington is 4.1 V/kwh. See Na-
tional Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, Washington Summary, available at http://www.
naruc.whatsup.net/customers/naruc/naruc.nsf/wwwStateSummaries/Washington.
173. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, Hawaii Summary, available at
http://www.naruc.whatsup.net/customers/naruc/naruc.nsf/wwwStateSummaries/Hawaii
(NARUC Energy Regulatory Database).
174. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs, Nebraska Summary, available at
http://www.naruc.whatsup.net/customers/naruc/naruc.nsf/wwwStateSummaries/Nebraska
(NARUC Energy Regulatory Database).
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Code. With less risk to factor into its sales prices, the generator should be
more willing and able to sell its electricity at a lower price.
Perhaps the best anecdotal evidence of the effect of the Code's cer-
tainty can be found in the Ecogen/Norcon litigation discussed in Part
1(B)(2) supra.175 After an extensive litigation in a state where electricity
did not fall within the Code (referred to here as a non-Code state), Nor-
con was required to provide adequate assurances as if it were governed
by the Code. In a Code-based state, the legal issue of whether Niagara
Mohawk had the right to demand adequate assurances would have been
known by both parties up-front; the only question would have been
whether the facts of the case warranted Niagara Mohawk's demand.
Reasoning back to the abstract by analogy, a generator entering into a
sales contract state in a non-Code state would have to figure the potential
litigation costs both for determining the legal standard for applying ade-
quate assurances and whether that standard was met in any given case. A
generator in a Code-based state, however, would only have to factor in
the latter uncertainty and thus be able to pass the savings onto its
customers. 1
76
The desire for lower energy costs raises another reason supporting the
use of the Code to govern the sale of electricity. As the electric industry
deregulates, one can assume that the interested parties (e.g., legislators,
regulators, utilities, energy producers, energy uses, etc.) would seek to
develop the most efficient new rules to reduce power costs. To this ex-
tent, the rules, structures, processes, etc. that such interested parties actu-
ally are developing treat the sale of electricity in a deregulated industry as
transactions in goods.
For example, in May 1999, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC") authorized the California Power Exchange to create a subsidi-
ary to facilitate block-forward trades of power.177 This subsidiary would
match sellers and buyers in "the trading of power for delivery" during
hours of peak electrical usage. 178 As another example, the National As-
sociation of Regulatory Utility Commissioners commissioned a study in
1998 to help establish the technical criteria necessary to track generation
attributes.179 This study is filled with words that reflect a view of electric-
175. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
176. I should emphasize that I am not making the argument that using the Code to
govern the sale of electricity will eliminate most or all of the litigation uncertainly associ-
ated with interpreting a sales contract. Like any other piece of legislation, the Code will be
subject to judicial interpretation that will lead to certain risks. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-102
cmt. 1 (2000) ("It is intended ... for the law embodied in this Act to be developed by the
courts .. "). Those risks will be factored into a seller's price. The argument that I am
making is simply that the Code generally provides a more certain set of base rules than
those provided by the common law of contracts.
177. See 87 F.E.R.C. 61,203 (Order Accepting for Filing Proposed Block-Forward Mar-
ket, as Modified).
178. Id.
179. See Paul A. Centolella & Craig Miller, Tracking Generation Attributes for Con-
sumer Disclosure: Technical Criteria for Tracking Systems, available at http://www.naruc.
org/DownloadableDocuments/tracking.htm, at 5-8 [hereinafter NARUC Study]. Genera-
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ity as a good: electricity resellers, retail generation products, taking title
to power, the right to withdraw energy from the power grid, and so on.
These terms, as well as the language regarding California's block-forward
trading, are used to describe a good-not a service-and that is how the
energy industry seems to view the sale of electricity when it is unbundled
from T&D services.
By setting up systems such as those just discussed, participants in the
deregulating energy industry are seeking in part to promote efficiency
180
to meet the goal proffered by deregulation advocates: to have lower costs
for energy consumers. Since industry participants are treating energy as a
good as a means to obtain lower costs, public policy concerns would dic-
tate that the law should follow this lead. The Code would do this as it
seeks to harmonize commercial law with modern commercial practices.
181
The use of the Code is completely compatible with the custom and usage
regarding electricity that is currently developing within the energy indus-
try. Thus, for these policy reasons, the Code should govern the sale of
electricity in a deregulated industry.
One possible policy reason against applying the Code to the unbundled
sale of electricity relates to the administrative problems that might arise
in doing so. Regardless of how electricity itself is treated, the T&D com-
ponents of electrical delivery should still be treated as services. As a re-
sult, a court might experience certain problems in trying to differentiate
between the electricity as a good and T&D as services. The easiest way
to avoid such problems, therefore, would be to treat all components of
electrical delivery, including generating and selling electricity, as a ser-
vice. 182 Thus, the Code would not apply.
Furthermore, even if the Code were to govern the sale of electricity,
many of its key provisions would be rendered meaningless. As noted
above, the Code's implied warranty of merchantability could not be
breached. In addition, a buyer would not be able to exercise certain
rights that the Code provides, such as being able to reject any goods that
do not conform to the contract 183 or revoke acceptance under specified
conditions. 184 With the Code's provisions gutted in this way, its primary
tion attributes include such information as what fuel source was used to generate the elec-
tricity as well as its environmental effects. With such a tracking system in place, consumers
will be better able to choose, for example, to buy electricity generated using a renewable
resource like hydro or solar power. "A credible and effective tracking system for genera-
tion products is essential to the development of a differentiated retail supply that will both
maximize consumer choice and facilitate the development of clean and renewable genera-
tion." Id. at 11.
180. See id. at 5.
181. U.C.C. §1-102(2) (2000) states in part: "Underlying purposes and policies of this
Act are: (a) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and
agreement of the parties .... "
182. A court could support this conclusion based on the Otte view that electricity is
merely the release of charged particles. See Otte, 523 N.E.2d at 838.
183. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (2000).
184. See U.C.C. § 2-608 (2000).
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purpose would be for calculating damages. A court likely would achieve
the same result in calculating damages by using most jurisdictions' rules
for determining damages stemming from the breach of a service con-
tract. 185 Given that some of the Code's most important provisions would
not apply to the sale of electricity in any event, and those important ones
that do remain are not really different from standard contract law, the
Code does not need to be used at all. For these reasons, electricity should
be considered a service.
These arguments present a strong case for not employing the Code at
all in the sale of electricity. But the Code contains other provisions that
can have much bearing on the course of litigating energy-related claims.
Remember, for example, that the New York Court of Appeals applied
the Code's provision on adequate assurances to the power purchase
agreement in dispute in the EcogenNorcon litigation. 186 In addition, an-
other New York court used the Code's provision regarding output con-
tracts in a different dispute between Niagara Mohawk and several
IPPs.187 In other words, many courts have reasoned by analogy from the
Code in areas where that jurisdiction's common law of service contracts is
insufficiently developed. 188 Such indirect use of the Code seems ineffi-
cient when, as with the unbundled sale of electricity, the Code can apply
directly.
In addition, the argument that the Code should not apply to any aspect
of generating, transmitting, or seller electricity may provide some simplic-
ity in judicial decision-making. But this argument ignores the reality of
the emerging competitive market in the energy industry. First, as dis-
cussed above, those in the trade are in fact treating generation as separate
and distinct from T&D. Second, and more importantly for litigation pur-
poses, courts will be required to clear certain hurdles to decide some fun-
damental procedural issues in any energy-related litigation.
Consider the following hypothetical. A consumer files a lawsuit based
on a single energy-related claim and lists three defendants: the T&D util-
ity, the company that sold the electricity to the consumer at the retail
level, and the generator from whom the seller bought electricity at the
wholesale level. Given the different roles that the utility, retail seller, and
wholesale generator play in the deregulated industry, only one of them
would potentially be liable to the plaintiff. As a result, the lawsuits
against the other two defendants would need to be dismissed for failure
to state a claim. For example, if the plaintiff's claim were related to the
185. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (comment a:
"Contract damages are ordinarily based on the injured party's expectation interest") with
U.C.C. §§ 2-703, 2-711 (2000) (the Code's general provisions regarding remedies).
186. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
187. See Philadelphia Corp. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 621 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (citing Code section 2-306 as one reference supporting the proposi-
tion that "[o]bligations arising under an output contract are subject to good faith and com-
mercial standards of fair dealing").
188. See Consolidated Edison, 590 F. Supp. at 269-70 (noting that New York courts
have applied Code provisions in areas where the Code does not govern).
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negligent delivery of the electricity, then the rightful defendant would be
the utility; the plaintiff would have no claim against either the retail or
wholesale sellers. To summarize, the judge would need to separate gener-
ation from T&D to determine the essence of the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion. Thus, any efficiencies that might be gained by treating the sale of
electricity in the deregulated market as a service would never come to
fruition.
This hypothetical highlights an important consequence of a state's deci-
sion to unbundle generation from T&D services. Deregulation effec-
tively necessitates the use of the gravamen test, if for no other reason to
ensure that plaintiffs are suing the correct party. Courts likely will need
to apply this test regularly, either explicitly or implicitly, to decide what
caused a plaintiff's alleged damages. As a result, there is no longer any
prominent barrier against applying the Code to electricity in states that
allow consumers to choose their energy supplier. Moreover, given the
legal and policy rationales discussed in this Comment, the Code's Article
2 should govern the sale of electricity in a deregulated industry. 189
2. States That Choose Not to Deregulate
The conclusion that the Code should govern in a deregulated state only
provides a partial answer. The question remains: what should be done in
those states that choose not to deregulate. As discussed above, some
states believe that their businesses' and citizens' best interests are served
by maintaining the current utility-dominated system.
In these states, many of the legal and policy issues are the same as
those litigated in the cases discussed in Part I. Thus, certain public policy
arguments may still hold, such as those put forth in New Balance where
the court held that the stringent regulation of utilities precluded the find-
ing that electricity was a good.190 Moreover, the administrative-ease ar-
gument considered in the previous section would carry more weight in a
utility-dominated state. Because the utility, and only the utility, interacts
directly with end-users in a regulated state, the need to consider the dif-
ferent components of electrical delivery separately dissipates to a large
degree. Regardless of the cause of action, end-users' claims will almost
always be against the utility. Thus, to simplify energy-related litigation,
courts could treat electrical delivery as either a good or a service. And
plenty of case law exists to support the latter. Thus, for public policy
189. One should note that even in deregulated states, at least one entity that sells elec-
tricity will be subject to state regulation: the provider of last resort. The provider of last
resort, usually a regulated utility, is the entity that is obliged to provide electricity to any-
one so as to ensure that people do not go without electricity in their homes or businesses.
The subject of the provider of last resort raises a host of its own public policy issues as
states and energy providers seek to balance the public service of having electricity availa-
ble to all people with issues of compensation and consumer protection. These issues are
beyond the scope here.
190. See, e.g., New Balance, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 398-99.
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reasons, courts in states with vertically integrated, regulated utilities may
find that the sale of electricity is a service.
The corollary of this position, however, is whether such policy reasons
are sufficient to overcome the legal basis discussed in Part II, supra, for
finding that the sale of electricity should be considered a transaction in
goods even in a regulated state. As noted above, the gravamen test can
be used in a regulated environment and would provide a useful means for
applying the Code when appropriate to do so. Moreover, since deregu-
lated states will need to employ a gravamen-style analysis to a great deal
of energy-related litigation, these decisions will provide judicial guidance
to those states that have not deregulated. If a state has rejected using the
gravamen test, however, it still could, and perhaps should, find that the
sale of goods is the predominant factor in the delivery of electricity.
Thus, the Code generally would apply to the sale of electricity. But such
a general rule would still allow courts to find ways in which to determine
that the Code did not apply in specific instances, such as the ZumBerge
court did.
The conclusion drawn from these two sets of arguments is that public
policy does not tilt strongly in either direction; it favors neither finding
that electricity is a service or that it is a good. But these policy arguments
hearken back to the old utility-monopoly framework. They do not take
into account the fact that, even if one state has retained the old system,
many other states and the federal government are moving toward, or at
least considering moving toward, a deregulated system premised on cus-
tomer choice. Within this new framework, an additional public policy
concern may arise.
Despite the rhetoric regarding consumer choice, deregulation is prima-
rily about trying to lower energy costs. Those states that have high power
rates hope that the advent of competition will reduce these costs. But
those states that have low rates either have been skeptical about deregu-
lation or rejected it outright, even though that means energy users in that
state cannot chose their energy supplier. These states have decided that
the lower energy costs more than compensate for the lack of choice.
If Congress, however, were to pass a comprehensive national deregula-
tion bill, the states' policy choice to keep the monopoly system would be
pre-empted by federal law.191 Thus, those states with a regulated utility
framework may wish to find ways in which to forestall the need for na-
tional legislation. Adopting the Code may provide one means to accom-
plish this goal. One underlying purpose of the Code is to "to make
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."' 92 Thus, regulated
states could argue that with uniform treatment of electricity transactions
191. National legislation, however, would not pre-empt state laws regarding contracts
or the Code. On another point, although beyond the scope of this Comment, the issue of
congressionally mandated consumer choice potentially raises a host of federalism issues
related to balancing the federal government's interstate commerce powers and the states'
police powers.
192. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (2000).
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under the Code the need for comprehensive national legislation is re-
duced. While this argument certainly has its limitations, 193 the flipside is
perhaps more persuasive. To the extent that the law relating to the sale
of electricity varies across jurisdictions, the need for federal legislation
may become more apparent given the fact that transmission lines and
power grids extend beyond state boundaries.
Regardless of the approach taken, the result is the same: a state may
be better able to preserve its policy choice to keep its utilities regulated if
it adopts the Code for the sale of electricity. Moreover, any other policy
considerations that would support rejecting the Code can be countered
by equally persuasive arguments in the Code's favor. Thus, taken with
the legal argument supporting the use of the Code, the better reasoned
approach would be to adopt the Code to govern the sale of electricity in
states that retain regulated utilities. But note that this conclusion refers
only to the sale of the good itself; to the extent possible, the gravamen
test should be used to separate those claims that arise due to the utilities'
T&D services.
C. LEGAL ISSUES IN A DEREGULATED INDUSTRY
Within this changing environment, new legal issues likely will arise.
Similarly, old issues will continue to be litigated, but with new twists.
Since the legal and policy arguments above support the contention that
the Code should govern transactions involving the unbundled sale of
electricity, one should consider how the Code would be used to resolve
these legal issues. Thus, we will now consider two selected issues that are
likely to arise in the deregulated energy industry, one related to warran-
ties and another related to remedies, as examples of applying the Code in
the deregulated industry.
1. Power Surges and Voltage Delivery Problems
The issue that may generate the most confusion in the new environ-
ment is actually one that has been heavily litigated. Specifically, plaintiffs
likely will continue to bring suits for damages associated with power
surges, excess voltage, stray voltage, etc. As discussed in the hypothetical
in Part II(B)(4), supra, a gravamen-style analysis will be necessary to de-
termine who are the proper parties to the case. But this analysis also will
help in assessing the proper outcomes of such cases.
Because the Code is assumed to govern the sale of electricity for this
discussion, energy merchants would be held strictly liable for any breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability under Code section 2-314.
But, as discussed above, in cases regarding surges, voltage, etc., the prob-
lem would not lie with the merchantability of the goods; the energy
merchant presumably provided goods that would still be fit for their ordi-
193. Certainly adopting the Code will not in and of itself forestall national legislation.
But it does provide one argument in favor of the states.
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nary purpose-that is, run electrical appliances, machines, etc.-which is
consistent with the Code's requirements for merchants. The claim's es-
sence, however, would go to how the electricity was distributed, thereby
bringing in the T&D utility but not the energy merchant.
This distinction may be an overly fine one. At least one commentator
(Rutz) has argued that energy merchants should be held to strict product
liability for defective energy.1 94 Because the product in this case cannot
be consumed without using the T&D system, the concept of "defect" for
energy could be extended to include "any inadvertent high or low...
electrical voltage that enters the home due to a distribution system fail-
ure."'1 95 Reasoning by analogy, this argument conceivably could be used
to invoke the Code's strict liability warranty of merchantability.
This argument, however, is faulty for several reasons regardless of
whether it is used in a product-liability case or for a sale under the Code.
First, this theory imposes strict liability on energy merchants for some-
thing over which they have no control-the effectiveness of the T&D sys-
tem to deliver the merchants' goods. 196 The Code's warranty of
merchantability requires that a plaintiff establish both causation in fact
and proximate causation for any breach of warranty. 197 In these surge
and voltage problems, the functioning of the T&D utility's delivery sys-
tem would step into the line of causation to become the proximate cause
of the energy consumers' damages; the line of proximate causation be-
tween the energy merchant and the buyer would be severed.
Rutz contends that the issue of holding energy merchants liable for the
T&D utility's service can be resolved by allowing a merchant to seek con-
tribution from the utility for negligence and requiring those parties to
determine the essence of the plaintiff's claim.' 98 Herein lies the second,
problem with this theory. By bringing in the T&D utility only as a third
party defendant while imposing strict liability on energy merchants, this
approach adds unnecessary costs and inefficiencies to both the sale of
energy and the legal system.
The T&D utility is compensated for regulating the delivery of electric-
ity into energy users' homes and businesses. The cost of doing so, which
would include costs associated with any liability arising from negligent
operations, will be incurred and passed onto ratepayers regardless of the
legal standard used. Likewise, energy merchants will pass on their costs
so as to maintain a comfortable profit margin. But here the legal stan-
dard does matter. If energy merchants are subject to strict liability, but
can seek contribution from the utility, the costs associated with both ex-
194. See Rutz, supra note 94, at 448-50.
195. Id. at 448.
196. Rutz acknowledges that his approach would hold "the energy merchant subject to
liability for defects in the delivery system." Id. at 447.
197. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-9
(4th ed. 1995); U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 13 (2000) ("[I]t is... necessary to show.., that breach
of the warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained.").
198. See Rutz, supra note 94, at 447.
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posure to liability and defending themselves ultimately will be reflected
in the price charged to consumers. These latter costs, however, do not
need to be incurred and indeed should not be. The key factual and legal
question in any surge/voltage situation will be whether the T&D utility
was negligent. Energy users will pay the costs associated with the utility's
negligence in any circumstance. Imposing the additional costs associated
with strict liability for energy merchants results in all consumers paying
twice for the utility's negligence.
The primary reason for pursuing the strict-liability-for-energy-
merchants theory is to protect energy users so that individual plaintiffs
would be made whole for any damages caused by surges/voltage. As just
seen, however, all energy users ultimately bear these costs. The more
efficient and legally proper avenue is for aggrieved energy users to pursue
recovery for damages directly against the T&D utility for the surge/volt-
age. Courts and state legislatures could decide whether such claims re-
quire utility negligence or if they would invoke some form of strict
liability consumer protection warranty; 199 such a policy consideration is
beyond the scope of this Comment. But one point is clear: energy
merchants should not be held strictly liable for damages caused by the
delivery of their otherwise merchantable goods.200
2. Retail Buyers' Remedies Under the Code in a Deregulated Industry
Regardless of the cause of action, any litigation eventually turns to the
issue of remedies. Although the general issues to be discussed will be
nothing new for students of the Code's approach toward remedies, their
use in the deregulated energy environment requires a certain focus. For
purposes here, I will consider a retail buyer's economic loss stemming
from the breach of contract as a means to highlight this issue.
Generally when a seller breaches a contract for sale, the buyer has a
choice.20' It may "cover" by purchasing substitute goods and seek dam-
ages measured by the "difference between the costs of cover and the con-
tract price. '202 Or the buyer may seek damages associated with the non-
delivery of goods equal to the difference between the contract and mar-
ket prices.203
The reality surrounding the retail sale of electricity in a deregulated
environment generally will mean that buyers will not seek damages for
199. See, e.g., Buckeye Union, 196 N.W.2d at 318.
200. Based on this reasoning, cases where someone accidentally touches a power line
clearly should not involve an energy seller. This case would relate to where the lines were
located and how they were constructed and maintained. Here, the argument is even
stronger that the energy merchant had nothing to do with the cause of action and, there-
fore, should not be considered liable. Moreover, if the T&D utility happens also to sell
electricity, the case should be based on its role as a T&D provider, not as a merchant in
goods.
201. See U.C.C. § 2-712 cmt. 3 (2000) ("[T]he buyer is always free to choose between
cover and damages for non-delivery.").
202. U.C.C. § 2-712(1) (2000).
203. See U.C.C. § 2-713 (2000).
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non-delivery. No energy user simply will go without using electricity until
the dispute with the breaching seller is resolved. Instead, consumers will
immediately cover-that is, purchase electricity either from the competi-
tive market or from the provider of last resort.20 4
The immediacy of purchasing covering electricity has a more significant
effect beyond dictating under which Code provision the buyer would sue.
Code section 2-715 allows aggrieved buyers to incidental and, more sig-
nificantly, consequential damages stemming from any breach. 20 5 Buyers
normally will try to recover consequential damages such as lost profits
and loss of goodwill.206 But the Code also "bars recovery for losses that
could have been prevented by cover. '207
Thus, suppose a firm looses business because its supplier failed to de-
liver goods under a contract. Further, assume that the firm could reason-
ably acquire substitute goods within one week. Generally, that firm
would be allowed to recover consequential damages equal to one week's
lost profit, but would be barred from recovering for profits beyond that
because such damages could reasonably have been mitigated. In the con-
text of purchasing electricity at the retail level, however, cover usually
will occur immediately.208 Situations may exist where the seller breaches
during a brownout period where electricity demand greatly outpaces sup-
ply and the provider of last resort has an insufficient supply as well. In
such situations, a person may not be able to find a seller immediately.
But absent such extenuating circumstances, aggrieved buyers generally
will have no basis to seek consequential damages such as lost profits fol-
lowing a seller's breach.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law regarding the commercial sale of electricity traditionally has
been subject to less-than-precise legal analysis. In any litigation that
arose in the regulated environment, the case invariably involved a utility
that generated, transmitted, and distributed electricity. Courts did not
need to distinguish clearly whether electricity should or should not be
considered a good, whether the sale of electricity was dominated by the
good or the service, or what the essence of the plaintiff's claim was. Nor
did they need to explain their conclusions in great detail.
The advent of the deregulated energy industry, however, will change
this tendency for cursory analysis. With an increase in the number of
industry participants, the complexity of energy transactions, and the
amount of money that could be at stake, courts will need to sort out many
detailed factual and legal issues, and then be ready to explain the out-
204. See supra note 189 regarding the provider of last resort.
205. See U.C.C. § 2-715 (2000).
206. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 197, at § 6-5.
207. Id. See also U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (2000) ("[A]nd which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise.").
208. In the case where it may not, the seller likely would argue that substitute electricity
reasonably could be purchased immediately.
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comes. While certainly not an intended consequence of deregulation, the
resulting improvement in jurisprudence stemming from it should be wel-
come by those in the industry.
Upon a proper analysis of the Code, one thing should be clear: the
unbundled sale of electricity is a transaction in goods and, therefore,
should be subject to the Code. The difficulties that will arise, however,
will stem from trying to reconcile this conclusion with existing case law,
particularly in jurisdictions that have found the sale of electricity in the
regulated environment to be a service. While previous cases certainly
cannot and should not be discarded on a whim, their value as precedent
may be limited. The deregulated energy industry-more precisely, that
component of the industry that is subject to competition-is a very differ-
ent structure than the one dominated by monopolies. It also seeks to
promote a different set of policy goals than the century-old model of reg-
ulation. Therefore, many of the underlying facts and premises from ex-
isting case law simply will not be found in cases that arise in the
deregulated environment. Thus, like the industry itself, the law governing
the industry may need to change.
New York State may provide the best barometer of whether such a
change will take hold. Despite occasionally applying Code provisions by
analogy, 20 9 New York has perhaps the strongest line authority rejecting
the application of the Code to electricity in a regulated environment. But
it also has been one of the states on the forefront of deregulation. As a
result, it faces the greatest tension in trying to reconcile the old and the
new.
209. See, e.g., Norcon, 705 N.E.2d at 662 (discussed supra at note 73 and accompanying
text); Philadelphia Corp., 621 N.Y.S.2d at 238 (discussed supra at note 187 and accompany-
ing text).
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